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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Petition for modification of decree of divorce to increase 
alimony and support payments, for delinquent support payments 
under decree of divorce in the sum of $1,200.00, order to show 
cause for contempt and attorney's fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted defendant's request for modification 
of the decree of divorce and increased support to be paid by 
plaintiff to defendant for the remaining minor child to $100. 00 
per month, increased alimony to be paid by plaintiff to defendant 
to$150.00 per month, denied defendant's claim for delinquent 
support payments and awarded defendant attorney's fees of $200. 00 
plus her costs. The Lower Court specifically retained jurisdiction 
of the matter to determine if support for the remaining minor child 
should continue beyond his eighteenth birthday, after his graduation 
from high school. The contempt portion of the order to show cause 
'ias di srni s s ed . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of the Lower Court's order and judgment denying 
Qefendant' s claim for delinquent support payments for Roger Allen 
,\,ker Pursuant to decree of divorce for the period from May, 1975 
:'' ti·,ro llctte of hearing of the order to show cause on June 14, 1977, 
sun1 of $1,200.00. 
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{2) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-appellant, Elaine Wiker, was granted a decree of 
divorce from the plaintiff-respondent, George Edward Wiker, on 
January 29, 1965. Mr. Wiker was ordered to pay support; Mrs. 
Wiker was awarded the care, custody and control of Roger Allen, 
then age 7, and Verlin Kay, then age 4. {R. 21-23). She was 
awarded as support the sum of $50. 00 per month for each of said 
minor children. The original decree of divorce was amended and 
modified by subsequent orders of the Court. {R. 31-32; R. 55-Sb; 
and R. 71-73). Support for the two minor children, Roger Allena:. 
Verlin Kay, was increased voluntarily in October of 1973, through 
the efforts of Allen Hodgson, Family Court Administrator, to $75.'.: 
per month per child, and support and alimony together totalled 
$220.00 per month. {R. 107-108, 109). When the minor child, Ro~' 
Allen, turned age 18 on May 27, 1975, the plaintiff, Mr. Wiker, 
stopped paying support for said child. Defendant, Mrs. Wiker, 
sought a judgment against plaintiff for the support payments 
by petition and order to show cause. {R. 77-82). The Lower 
Court denied the claim of defendant, Mrs. Wiker, for the delinquer: 
support on the basis that the Legislature had changed the age of 
majority for boys to 18 years of age subsequent to the decree of 
divorce and that plaintiff, Mr. Wiker, did not have to pay suppor: 
for the child in question after age 18. (R. 105 I 110). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDl'.ilT 
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(3) 
DELINQUENT SUPPORT BY INCORRECT APPLICATION OF THE LAW. 
The Lower Court, in denying defendant's claim for delinquent 
support, concluded that the law amended by the Legislature in the 
"ear 1975 relieved the plaintiff, Mr. Wiker, from payi.ng support 
I 
for the minor child, Roger Allen, after age 18, under the decree 
of divorce of January 29, 1965. At the time the decree of divorce 
in this case was entered by the Court, Title 15-2-1 U.C.A. 1953, 
before amendment, provided that 11 the period of minority extends 
in males to 21 years of age". The Utah Legislature, under pressure 
1:.: of the united States Supreme Court's decision in Stanton v. Stanton, 
421 U.S. 7, 95 s.ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688, amended Title 15-2-1 
1 U.C.A. (L. Utah 1975) to read: 
I 
"The period of minority extends in males and females to 
the age of eighteen years; * * * *." 
The Lower Court applied the above cited Statute as amended to 
the decree of divorce in this case retroactively. The Lower Court 
concluded that the Legislature in so amending 15-2-1 U.C.A., changed 
or modified the decree of divorce. The con cl us ion of the Lower 
Court is clearly contrary to and in conflict with the rulings of 
this Court in the Stanton cases. In Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 
1010, this Court stated at page 1013: 
"The general rule is that the decree fixes the obligations 
of the parties; and they cannot modify it or change their 
obligations by their conduct. * * * *." 
II I 
n the absence of any modification of the decree, the support 
money accrued in accordance with its terms; and it was not the 
prerogative of the defendant to unilaterally decide that he 
would not pay support money * * *. 11 
Wiker, the plaintiff in this case, discontinued paying 
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(4) 
support for Roger Allen when he turned 18 years of age, May 27 I 
197 5. There was no modifica tiori of the decree of divorce Which 
was entered when the law provided that support would be paid for 
males to age 21. In the later Stanton case, 552 P.2d 112, the 
age of the male child was never called into question. This Cour 
said at page 114: 
"The question before us is the interpretation to be g09 
to the decree of divorce from which no appeal has ever 
been taken by either party. That decree is final and 
cannot now be changed. At the time the decree was made, 
everybody knew that for almost one hundred years the age of 
majority for girls was and had been 18. The Judge and thE 
the parties to this proceeding all assumed that when the 
decree stated that the father should be the one to furnish 
the support for the children during their minority it 
meant that the father should furnish the support forthe 
son until he reached age 21 * * * No honest interpretati1 
of that decree can be made to the contrary." (Emphasis 
Added). 
Chief Justice Henriod, in his concurring opinion, stated at 
pages 114 and 115: 
"Because this Court upheld an award for support of a 
female child until she became 18, but not thereafter, 
certainly is no matter of res judicata as to the fact, 
therefore, that a male (who is not particeps here), 
is entitled to support, in a divorce, only until he 
iS 18 I * * * 11 
"At the time of the entry of the decree, * * *, our Statute 
Section 15-2-1 U.C.A. 1953, provided: 
The period of minority extends in males to age of 
twenty one years and in females to that of eighteen 
years." 
"Itcould not be plainer that under both the statutor~he 
decisional law of this State as it existed at the.~ 
decree was entered, and therefore as was necessari Y rt 
the contemplation of the parties, and of the trial cou ' 
the only obligation it imposed upon the defendant~. 
that he pay the $100 per month until his daughter ~9. 
was 18." (Emphasis Added). 
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(5) 
Applying the same rational to this case, it is clear that 
the decree of divorce, under both the statutory and decisional 
law existing at the time the decree was entered, imposed upon 
plaintiff that he pay support for his son until age 21 at the rate 
of $75. oo per month. 
l 
Justice Maughan, in his dissenting opinion, advanced an 
additional theory in support of the position of defendant, Mrs. 
\liker. He stated at page 117: 
"Under one theory, if the statute be deemed void, the 
cor.unon law "shall be the rule of decision in all Courts 
of this State". ( 68-3-1) Under the common law, both 
male and female attain their majority at the age of 21 
years." 
Applying this theory to the instant case, the plaintiff, 
Mr. Wiker, was obligated to pay support for Roger Allen until 
age 21, as well as by order of the Court under the decree of divorce. 
Article I, Section 18, Utah Constitution prohibits the passing 
of ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts. 
If this in fact be the law in the State of Utah, the amending of 
Title 15-2-1 by the Legislature should have had no retroactive 
effect on the decree of divorce in this case entered prior to 
such amendment. The law in force and effect at the time of the 
~~~ provided that support should be paid for males until age 
21. Until the decree of divorce was modified as to the age when 
support would terminate, Mr. Wiker was obligated to pay support for 
Roger Allen until age 21. The defendant, Mrs. Wiker, was entitled 
to a judgment for all delinquent support payments admittedly not 
b~ Plaintiff under the decree. The retroactive application of 
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(6) 
Title 15-2-1 after amendment by the Lower Court was error, 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, defendant, Mrs. Wiker, submits that the 
Lower Court committed error in denying her claim for delinquent 
support of $75.00 per month for the minor son, Rober Allen 
Wiker, under the decree of divorce of January 29, 1965, as modi· 
fied, for the period of May 27, 1975 to the date of hearing in 
the total sum of $1,200.00, plus interest. 
Served two (2) copies of the 
foregoing Brief Of Appellant 
on Respondent by delivering 





430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
of James A. Mcintosh & Associates, 
525 South 300 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on this /2;' day of 
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